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Robert R.M. Verchick and Nina Mendelson

INTRODUCTION

American government is an experiment in redundancy, with powers and
duties shared among federal, state, and local decision makers. The arrange
ment is designed to divide power, maximize self-rule, and foster innovation,
but it also can breed confusion. In the areas of public safety and environ
mental protection, state and federal leaders (to name the two most active
players in these disputes) are often seen jockeying for the inside track, hoping
to secure the resources or authority needed to promote their views of the
public good or gain politically. To outside observers, the best outcomes are
not obvious. For example, should the federal government be the exclusive
regulator of automobile pollution, as it is of automotive fuel efficiency, or
should (as U.S. Senators from California successfully argued in i967) Cali
fornia also be allowed to set its own unique, more stringent standards? Should
New Jersey be able to issue regulations requiring chemical plant managers to
consider safer technology to reduce the risks of terrorism incidents, or should
those requirements be imposed only if the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security allows them?' Should state judges or juries be allowed to conclude,
applying state tort law, that a pharmaceutical company has negligently failed
to warn patients of drug side effects if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
has already approved the drug label? Deciding when federal law trumps state
law can be a complicated process, involving the legislature, the judiciary, and
even executive agencies. The guiding principles always include federalism.
Federalism is concerned with the distribution of power between the federal
government and state governments. Most significantly, the Constitution gives
'

this book was going to press, Congress expressly resolved this question by adopting a savings
clause for state law on chemical plant security. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.
No. uo-161, S 534, 121 Stat. 1844, 2075 (2007) (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. S 121 note).
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Congress the power to make laws in areas affecting interstate commerce,
military defense, and civil rights. This delegation of powers contemplates
some impingements on state autonomy. Meanwhile the TenthAme
. ndment
reserves powers to the states. With a federal government of limited powers,
and states wielding plenary powers, realms of separate sovereignty and polit
ical accountability might seem to be the norm. Yet the modern understanding
of the Constitution's provisions leaves generous room for state and federal
overlap. Within these boundaries, however, Congress can use its lawmaking
powers either to leave space for state authority or else to eclipse, or preempt,
state power. The Constitution's Supremacy Clause makes clear that state law
must yield to federal law as supreme. Preempting state law is not unfair,
according to federalism theory, because political safeguards built within the
legislative process (such as the fact that Senators are elected state by state)
deter federal lawmakers from routinely bulldozing over the states' interests.
This chapter focuses on Congress's preemption power and examines the most
common legal and theoretical issues surrounding its use.
The two most important questions about preemption are related. The first
is for the lawmaker: when, or in what way, should Congress act to preempt
state laws in favor of federal ones? The second is for the judge: how do you
know that state law has been preempted? In answering the first question,
policy makers must consider the relative strengths of federal and state regu
lation. A more centralized federal approach promises uniformity, and with it
fewer transaction costs associated with compliance, the containment of trans
boundary "spillover" effects, and economies of scale. A more decentralized,
state-based approach is associated with greater government responsiveness
and citizen participation, allowances for regional variability, and helpful
experimentation among states.
As for the second question, sometimes Congress's intent to preempt state

law is clear and plainly stated in a statute. But sometimes there is doubt. A
statute may not declare preemption outright but may conflict with state law;
or it may be so broad as to "occupy the field" of targeted regulation, leaving
states with no power in the area. The courts have articulated a presumption,
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow, against reading a statute
to preempt state law where Congress's intent is not clear. That somewhat
inconsistently applied presumption is informed, in part, by concerns about
not trenching on state authority or eclipsing state sovereignty "accidentally"
without full consideration by a federal deliberative legislature.Besides exam
ining the issues related to congressional decisions to preempt state law, this
chapter will also examine the theoretical assumptions underlying judicial
reluctance to read a statute as preempting state law.

Preemption and Theories of Federalism

PREEMPTION AND THE CONGRESS
Reading the Constitution, one might think it utterly clear, as some have
argued,2 that the federal government can freely preempt state governments
from regulating the environment, pharmaceutical safety, employment rela
tionships, or nearly any other subject that is within Congress's legislative
authority. After all, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause states, "This Con
stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of.any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding" (art. VI, cl. 2). Moreover, courts have
long read the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate
"Commerce . . . among the several States" (art. II, Sec. 8, cl. 3), as an
independent prohibition of state laws that discriminate against or unduly
burden interstate commerce.
In short, Congress could make policy for the nation, and its choices would
be supreme notwithstanding contrary state government views. Assuming Con
gress is properly using its constitutional powers (such as the power to regulate
commerce), the only constitutional obstacle might be the Tenth Amendment,
which suggests that some powers "not delegated to the United States . . . are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." But that amendment has
been interpreted by the courts to restrain Congress from preempting state
authority only narrowly - by, for example, "commandeering" state employees
or resources to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."3 As we see
it, the Tenth Amendment today presents no other obstacle to federal preemption
even in traditionally "local" fields such as the protection of health and safety.
Despite Congress's broad preemptive power, many, if not most, areas of law
are governed concurrently by federal and state governments. Lively debate
continues in many settings about whether state regulatory authority should be
forced to yield to federal power or whether Congress has actually acted to
preempt state law and to what extent. The "presumption against preemption"
applied by courts tends to moderate the extent to which states will be barred
from regulating. Congress regularly legislates to share power or to preserve
state authority.
Given an effective federal government with far-reaching power to regulate,
why preserve state authority to regulate? Debates on whether to preempt state
2

3

See Caleb Nelson, "Preemption," VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 66, no. 3 (2000): 225.
See PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting NEW YORK
STATES, 505 U.S. 144, 157 [1992]).
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law often draw on ideas of federalism - a general concern with the division of
power between the federal and state governments and with maintaining core
attributes of state sovereignty. A state's authority to devise its own laws is
among these core aspects of state sovereignty.4 As developed in a recent series
of cases, another core aspect is preserving a state's sovereign immunity from
private lawsuits seeking money damages, a protection emphasized by a now
expansively interpreted Eleventh Amendment.5
Federalism advocates identify several benefits of preserving a state's sover
eignty and autonomy to regulate. F irst, some argue that strong state authority,
of which authority to regulate is a part, is important to the scheme of separa
tion of powers developed by the Framers of the Constitution. Like the division
of powers among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the fed
eral government, maintaining significant state government power can help
avoid the undue concentration of power in the federal government and pre
serve essential individual liberties.6 Moreover, where a federal program
depends on state and local implementation or cooperation, the involvement
of states might prompt the federal government toward helpful moderation of
its policies. For example, after Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act, many
state and local governments objected, with some directing their officials not to
participate in parts of the program.7
Second, if states possess robust authority to regulate, the policies
chosen within a state will tend to be tailored to local concerns and to
citizen preferences. For example, some western and southwestern states,
where spicy Mexican candies are popular, monitor and regulate those
candies for contamination with lead dust. 8 Although lead dust in these can
dies presents a significant safety threat, especially to children, the federal

4

5

6

7

8

See Robert R. M. Verchick, "The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and the Inter
state Garbage Wars," SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L A W REVIEW 70, no. 5 (1997): 1239.
ALDEN V. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); COLL. SAV. BANK V. FLA. PREPAID POSTSECONDARY
Eouc. EXPENSE Bo., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); FLA. PREPAID POSTSECONDARY Eouc. EXPENSE
Bo. v. COLL. SAv. BANK, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
See, e.g., ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL V. SCANLON, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (the '"constitu
tionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government was
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties'").
See Susan Schmidt, "PATRIOT Act Misunderstood, Senators Say; Complaints About Civil
Liberties Go Beyond Legislation's Reach, Some Insist," WASHINGTON POST, October 22, 2003,
� (noting "nearly 200 cities and three states have passed resolutions contending that the
PATRIOT Act . . . tramples on civil liberties"); Ann Althouse, "The V igor of Anti-Comman
deering Doctrine in Times of Terror," BROOKLYN L AW REVIEW 69, no. 4 (2004): 1253.
E.g., Deborah Vanpelt, "State Fears Candies Pose Health Risk; Mexican suckers pulled from
shelves," TAMPA TRIBUNE, December 9, 1994, 1 (describing efforts of F lorida, California,
Texas, and Arizona with respect to Mexican candies).
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government failed for several years to give high priority to this regional
issue.9
Third, preserving state regulatory authority may also benefit citizens by
prompting greater engagement in government. Citizens are often presumed
to be able to participate more directly in policy making at the state level.
Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens
to participate in governance and seek responsive government. That may result
in greater "civic virtue" in citizens by encouraging them to become better
informed and more actively engaged in all levels of government.10 Although it
has been a benefit claimed for federalism, the goal of stimulating greater
citizen engagement may logically lead to calls for concentrating power in
localities, such as cities, rather than states. "
Fourth, preserving state authority to regulate can mean, in the words of
Justice Louis Brandeis, that the states are able to function as "laborator[ ies]"
that can try "novel social and economic experiments" to solve society's prob
lems. Other states and the federal government may learn from or adopt one
state's innovative approach, ultimately benefiting the entire country.12 To take
this a step further, some scholars now argue that such regulatory innovation
sets up a "competitive interaction" between the federal government and the
states and among the states.'3 Professor Robert Schapiro develops this
claim further in Chapter

2.

Because citizens can compare the different

responses of the federal and state governments to a particular problem, they
may be better able to understand the range of options and hold government
officials accountable for an inadequate response. That may in tum prompt
regulators to be more thorough and more responsive to citizen preferences.
For example, recent state and municipal efforts to reduce greenhouse gases
9

In October 2006, the FDA finally issued guidance to industry indicating that if lead levels in
candy likely to be eaten by small children exceeded the recommended level of 0.1 parts per
million, the candy manufacturer could face enforcement action. See U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, "Guidance for Industry: Lead in Candy Likely to be Consumed Frequently by
Small Children," (October 2006) (available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/

10
11
12

05d-0481-gdlooo2.pdf).
See, e.g., GREGORY

v.

ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).

See Frank Cross, "The Folly of Federalism," CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 24, no. 1 (2002):
See NEW STATE lcE Co.

v.

i.

LIEBMANN, 285 U.S. 26z, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

(describing states as "laborator[ies]").
13

Kirsten Engel, "Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,"
EMORY LAW JouRNAL 59, no. 1 (2006): 159; Roderick Hills, "Against Preemption; How Fed
eralism Can Improve the National Legislative Process,'' NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
82, no. 1 (2007): 1; Robert Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: How A FEDERAL SYSTEM
PROTECTS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming);
William W. Buzbee, "Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 82, no. 6 (2007): 1547.
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and address climate change have prompted a national dialogue questioning
the extent of federal action on climate change. And federal action can
also sidestep the pervasive risk of state failure to address a risk due to "free
rider" temptations that could lead all states to delay in the hope that others
will act.
Notwithstanding the federalism-related benefits of preserving state author
ity to regulate, there still may be reason to limit state control over a particular
regulatory issue or to supplement it with federal regulation. A federal, rather
than a state-focused, approach is more likely to effectively address problems
that cross state lines. Consider a factory that dumps pollution in a rural Illinois
river, making the river downstream, next to a populous Missouri town,
unswimmable and undrinkable. The upstream state government may not
have a strong incentive to take into account the harm to downstream, out
of-state residents - a "negative externality" from an in-state activity that may
generate jobs and tax revenue. The federal government accordingly may
select more appropriate water pollution standards. In addition, a uniform
federal approach will minimize the risk that states will "race to the bottom, "
competing with each other to loosen their environmental or other standards
so as to attract new business.14 Recent scholarship by Dean Richard Revesz
argues that state regulators likely will select environmental standards that
maximize citizen welfare overall rather than "racing to the bottom."15 Other
scholars, including Professor Kirsten Engel, disagree, persuasively arguing
that politicians may have a strong incentive to be perceived as doing "every
thing possible" to attract a new business to the state, including relaxing envi
6
ronmental standards below an optimal level.1 At a minimum, this scholarship
raises important questions about whether state regulation may sometimes be
affected by pathologies causing state regulators to choose less-than-optimal
levels of environmental protection.
F inally, a national standard can give each citizen an assurance - even
something of an entitlement - to a minimum level of safety, health, or envi
ronmental protection, no matter where he or she resides. A single federal
approach, without separate state standard-setting, also has advantages for
regulated entities. Those who must comply with regulation can face a
14

Scott R. Saleska and Kirsten H. Engel, "'Facts Are Stubborn Things': An Empirical Reality
Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Stand
ard-Setting," CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 8, no.

1

(1998): 55-fo (describ

ing "race to the bottom" in environmental context, whereby relaxation of local standards leads
15
16

to decline in locality's social welfare).
E.g., Richard L. Revesz, "The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation:

A Response to Critics," MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 82, no. 2 (1997): 535·

See Saleska and Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things," SUPRA n. 14, at 74-84.
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regulatory regime that is more certain and uniform and thereby avoid multi
ple layers of regulation, which not only may be costly to comply with but also
may be costly to figure out. This is one reason why regulated entities have
frequently sought preemption. Pro-preemption arguments can have particular
force when the regulatory requirement consists of a design requirement, such
as specifying air-bag requirements for cars. Multiple design requirements
could result in very high costs of compliance as manufacturers retool their
assembly lines for different state requirements.
A unitary federal approach might also save resources, as only one govern
ment, the federal government, would invest its resources in developing regu
latory standards. A fully encompassing federal regulation thus might benefit
from economies of scale. Congress has sometimes completely preempted
state regulatory requirements, as with the federal motor vehicle safety
standards.
A very appealing approach is to capture benefits on both sides by creating a
hybrid, power-sharing arrangement between the federal government and the
states. For example, as in many environmental laws, Congress may specify
that federal law serve as a "floor" of minimum protection but that states
remain free to adopt standards that are more protective of health or the
environment. That gives citizens a minimum level of protection but leaves
states free to experiment or satisfy local calls for stricter protection. Even with
federal environmental standards in place, some citizens may still face acute
localized risks, called "hot spots" by environmentalists; preserving state
authority to go beyond federal standards can allow an effective response to
these local problems.17 Alternatively, even if a particular consumer product
does not violate federal standards, individuals injured by the product may still
be free to go to state court and argue that under state tort law requiring, say,
reasonable care, the manufacturer should be liable for product defects or
failure to warn consumers. The continuing availability of tort claims is likely
to prompt the manufacturer to address safety concerns that regulators have not
yet anticipated.
In addition, as some have argued in the environmental setting, concurrent
state and federal authority furthers the goal of precaution, by ensuring that the
more stringent standards, whether national or local, take precedence. States
'7

See Zygmunt

J.

B. Plater et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND

SOCIETY (New York: Aspen P ublishers, 2004), 335 (discussing benefits of "savings" clauses
in federal legislation); Robert R. M. Verchick, "Fair Distribution of Environmental Harms
and Benefits," in A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON
MENT, ed. Christopher Schroeder and Rena Steinzor (Durham, NC: Carolina Press, 2004)
(discussing distributional harms in environmental policy).
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are generally barred from adopting environmental standards that are less
protective than federal ones.
Finally, states implementing federal law under "delegated program" struc
tures typically undertake significant responsibility to implement a federal
program by, for example, developing their own individual requirements that
will meet a federal program's goal or by issuing permits to individual compa
nies or other entities that must comply with federal law. States thereby may
retain greater flexibility to respond to local concerns - and to counterbalance
federal authority- but within the framework of a federal program that seeks to
address a particular issue at a national level.
Assuming that the states and the federal government do not require, sav,
disparate design standards, these sorts of power-sharing approaches can be
advantageous and workable. They can help prevent "races to the bottom"
and protect against federal inaction or other regulatory pathologies at both
levels of government. However, they still may impose the burden on a partic
ular company or entity of having to comply with more than one regulatory
standard in a particular location.
Assuming the importance of federalism interests and a state's autonomy to
regulate, how might those interests best be protected in a federal regime? One
position is that the federal legislative process can adequately protect state
autonomy. The Supreme Court has cited this "political safeguards" approach,
for example, in declining to judicially enforce the Tenth Amendment, with
the exception of the anti-commandeering requirement, as a constraint on
federal power over state governments.
According to the "political safeguards" approach, Congress will select the
appropriate balance between federal and state authority and will credit the
8
need for state authority and autonomy. 1 First, state officials and organizations
(such as associations of governors and attorneys general) frequently present
their views through testimony to Congress or through informal means. Fur
ther, members of Congress are elected by district or by state, and so have an
incentive to take state interests into account in considering legislative pro
posals. Moreover, Congress generally wants the cooperation and support of
state governments in its programs and so will consistently consider state inter
ests. Finally, because voters generally favor federalism values, members of
Congress, responsive to electoral views, will also support state interests.

'8

E.g., Larry D. Kramer, "Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,"
COLUMBIA LAW R eview 100, no. 1 (2000); 215; Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern
ment," COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 54, no. 4 (1954): 543·
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But not everyone accepts the "political safeguards" view. Some experts
contend that because there is no guarantee that Congress will protect state
interests, courts should help preserve state autonomy and authority by inde
pendently enforcing states' rights.19 For example, as discussed earlier, judges
have been willing to strike down federal statutes as violating the Tenth
Amendment because they "commandeer" state resources for use in federal
programs. Some also might characterize the judicial presumption against
preemption, discussed in the next section, as a lesser form of independent
judicial protection of state authority and autonomy.
PREEMPTION AND THE COURTS

Even once Congress has enacted a federal statute, with a full opportunity for
states and state organizations to have their views heard, whether the statute
preempts state law and to what extent may not be altogether clear. Congress
may not foresee a relevant change, such as a change in technology or in state
regulatory practice. For example, some have criticized the preemption lan
guage in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which
covers employee benefit plans; despite dramatic changes in the health care
system - including an explosion of managed health care plans - the act has yet
to be seriously updated.20 Sometimes Congress will deliberately not answer a
preemption question because its members cannot reach agreement. For
example, in the fall of 2006, Congress debated whether states should be
preempted from requiring any further federal chemical plant security meas
ures beyond those required under federal law. Congress could not reach
agreement at the time, and 2006 legislation requiring the setting of federal
chemical plant requirements included no language either preempting state
law or "saving" state law. And of course, sometimes statutory language is writ
ten in a way that is unintentionally vague or incomplete.
When faced with such a statute in the context of a dispute over whether
state law is preempted, courts must interpret the statute to decide whether it
preempts the state from regulating. As discussed in greater detail by Professor
Schroeder in Chapter 6, a court may conclude that Congress has "expressly
preempted" state law, usually through statutory language that specifies which
laws are preempted. Courts also may infer (through "implied preemption"
'9

'0

E.g., Frank B. Cross, "The Folly of Federalism," CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 24, no. 1 (2002): 1, 8-12;
Marci A. Hamilton, "The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism," ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACAD
EMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 574 (March 2001): 94·
E.g., Donald Bogan, "Protecting Patients' Rights Despite ERISA," TULANE LAW REVIEW 74,
no. 3 (2000): 95r.
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analysis) preemptive intent when state law "conflicts" with the federal law.
Sometimes conflict arises when compliance with both state and federal law is
physically impossible. Other times a court will find conflict when a state law
poses an obstacle to the full accomplishment of a federal goal ("obstacle
preemption"). Finally, a court might conclude, as the Supreme Court has
with immigration law, that Congress has "occupied the field" of a particular
regulatory area. This form of preemption, called "field preemption," is based
both on congressional intent and on whether the federal government has
traditionally controlled regulation in the area.21
In determining whether Congress has preempted state law, modern courts
have generally applied a presumption against preemption, especially in reg
ulatory areas commonly left to the states. Courts have refused to find state law
preempted unless a federal statute provides a "clear statement" that state law
is to be preempted or other strong evidence that preemption is the "clear and
manifest purpose" of Congress.22
How might the presumption be justified? A plausible response is that it is
not justified at all, because Congress possesses the largely unfettered power to
preempt state law freely. The correct judicial response to a statute that might
preempt state law accordingly might be to apply no presumption. But some
times courts need a "tiebreaker" to resolve whether an ambiguously worded
statute actually does preempt state law. As a clear "default" rule used to break
such ties, the presumption against preemption also provides Congress with
greater certainty about how courts will interpret statutory language that does
not clearly address preemption.23
Even though the use of some clearly stated tiebreaker by judges is useful,
the question remains whether the judicial choice of the particular default rule against preemption - is the right choice or an inappropriate "thumb on the
scale." Congress frequently guards state interests. Perhaps, then, the presump
tion against preemption follows a reasonable assumption that unless Congress
says otherwise, it does not intend to limit state regulation. However, congres
sional intent with respect to state law is not always clear. In the absence of
legislative language that "saves" state law, perhaps courts should assume that
Congress's main concern is the effectiveness of federal law, a priority that
overrides state law with conflicting rules or values.
,. See, e.g., HINES v. DAVIDOWITZ, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (finding Pennsylvania alien registration
law preempted).
See, e.g., RICE v. SANTA FE ELEVATOR CORP., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in MED
TRONIC, INC. V. LOHR, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
23 See Nina Mendelson, "Chevron and Preemption," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 102, no. 3 (2004):
737, 745-46.
22
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If the presumption against preemption does not represent a judge's best
guess at Congress's actual intent, how else might it be understood? By requir
ing a clear statement or some other strong evidence from Congress that it
intends preemption, judges can reduce the chance of Congress thoughtlessly
eclipsing state sovereignty. For example, if the statute specifically mentions
state law preemption, it increases the chances that state law preemption will
have received actual discussion in Congress. Thus, absent a clear statement or
strong evidence, a presumption against preemption promotes legislative delib
eration. Professor Bradford Clark, in Chapter 9, embraces this presumption,
rooting his argument in the Constitution's language and structure.
In addition to a procedural bias in favor of more deliberation, a clear
statement rule also imposes a substantive bias in favor of state autonomy.
By raising the bar to establish preemption, the rule effectively protects a larger
field of state authority. That may serve a judicial desire to minimize congres
sional tampering with the federal-state framework and, in the words of the
Supreme Court, to avoid "serious intrusion into state sovereignty."24 The
effect is to give state autonomy and authority some additional protection in
court beyond what states have been able to obtain in the political process.
Although such an approach seems inconsistent with the "political safeguards"
approach embraced by the Supreme Court in other settings, advocates of this
approach stress the constitutional importance of the federal-state balance and
argue that relaxing judicial constraints might put the federal fox in charge of
the states' chicken coop. They argue that courts should more actively patrol
the line between states and the federal government as part of reinforcing the
constitutional structure and supporting the "tradition" of federalism.25
But applying a presumption against preemption also has significant down
sides. For instance, insisting that courts always attempt to read statutes without
clear preemptive language in the states' favor can force courts to adopt a more
"federalist" interpretation of a statute even when that interpretation is not the
,
best reading of the statute's language. Ours is a country of "laws, not men.' ,6 Too
many deviations from statutory language by judges can undermine the integrity
of the law. At its worst, the presumption against preemption could become a
cloak for illegitimate judicial policy choices - enabling what Professors William
,
Eskridge and Philip Frickey call "under-the-table constitutional lawmaking.' ,7
24

'5
'6

27

See MEDTRONIC, INC . , v. LOHR, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996).
See sources cited SUPRA n. 19.
The phrase has been attributed to Livy. See Harold Bruff, "The Incompatibility Principle,"
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 59, no. 2 (2007): 225.
William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, "Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking," VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 45, no. 3 (1992): 593, 635
(discussing clear statement rules).
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Judges might simply be sneaking policy through the "back door," using the
presumption against preemption to impose their own views of the correct bal
ance of state and federal power. States can adequately protect the prerogative
to regulate through their influence in Congress, and judges should be discour
aged from displacing Congress by trying to minimize federal preemption of
state law.28
On this view, the judiciary might leave the question of state law preemption
wholly to the political process, applying no presumption at all. Some argue
that the policy choices involved in preserving or preempting state authority to
regulate are more appropriately made on a case-by-case basis by Congress, our
most democratic institution and the one most accountable to voters. The
argument is even stronger, given Congress's clear power under the Constitu
tion's Supremacy Clause to preempt state law as part of exercising its other
constitutional authorities.
In our view, preemption advocates make a persuasive claim - up to a
point. Congress clearly has the prerogative to preempt state law and
should not be forced to express that desire in any unusually specific or clear
way as long as the ultimate meaning can be discerned. But where there is
significant ambiguity, a rule favoring state authority is, it seems to us, appro

priate. Such a clear intent rule would foster uniformity among courts and
acknowledge the traditional interests in local control, while at the same time
preserving for the Congress maximum latitude in expressing its desires. Pro
fessor Clark examines compromise positions like this more completely in
Chapter 9.

SPECIAL CASES
Disagreements about preemption, in the courtroom and in the academy, tend
to revolve around certain kinds of cases in which the merits of federal or state
interests seem particularly strong. Such "special cases" often involve questions
about which branch is asserting preemption, the nature of the laws being
preempted, or both. Another notable case involves federal provisions designed
to "save" a role for state decision making. We emphasize the special cases for
three reasons. First, they test the endurance of preemption advocates and
skeptics by asking just how far each will go in defending a theoretical position.
Second, special cases sometimes point to weaknesses in a background rule,
suggesting the need for fine-tuning or even exceptions. Finally, because these
cases are drawn from current controversies in law and politics, they acquaint
2s
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readers with the new frontiers of preemption analysis. Here is where the
rubber meets the road.
W ho Is Preempting?

Should preemption analysis change according to who is asserting preemption?
Our analysis so far has assumed that Congress, explicitly or implicitly, com
mands the preemption. But as discussed in greater depth in Professor William
Funk's accompanying Chapter 10, recently we have seen a trend in which
state preemption is imposed not by Congress, but by executive agencies. In
2005, for instance, the Food and Drug Administration took the position that its
labeling requirements for tuna preempted California's efforts to add any addi

tional warnings on the product.29 The California label would have warned
consumers about the threat of mercury contamination; the FDA would have
required no warning label. That same year, the U.S. Department of Trans
portation issued a proposed rule finding that its new "roof crush" standards for
automobiles would preempt any additional requirements at the state level including findings of liability under state tort law.3° Sometimes, preemption is
specifically authorized by Congress in the formative statute. Sometimes, as in
the preceding examples, it is not. Agency-made regulation, if the agency is
properly exercising the authority it received from Congress, can have the
same preemptive effect as a federal statute.3' And if compliance with both
an agency regulation and state law is physically impossible, the agency regu
lation clearly prevails over the state law. Beyond this, courts and scholars
disagree about how to interpret the bounds of underlying congressional
authority. Must Congress expressly delegate to an agency the right to upend
state law through regulatory act? Or may an agency infer such authority from
less explicit or even ambiguous statutory language? If the latter, may agencies
infer preemptive powers whenever convenient, or only as a "last resort" to
accomplish federal goals?
29
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A pro-preemption argument would assert that despite the agency twist, the
federal actors should remain supreme. Federal agencies are enforcers of legis
lative command, and courts should interfere as little as possible with the
federal enforcement of federal law. Moreover, as enforcers and implementers
of federal statutes, agency officials have the closest understanding of how to
achieve federal goals.32 Agency officials are the first to know if the accomplish
ment of their delegated mission has been jammed by state "obstacles" or
transformed into a functional "impossibility." In addition, although agencies
are naturally focused on federal goals, they have incentives to consider state
interests and federalism values. Top executive agency officials are appointed
by and report to the President, and, even in relatively liberal administrations,
the White House has guarded traditions of federalism. For instance, President
Clinton's Executive Order i3,13233 directs all federal agencies to be mindful of
state powers when implementing federal law and specifically directs agencies
(when possible) to favor interpretations that do not preempt state laws.34
Should these safeguards fail, Congress always retains the power to correct
agency overreaching by amending the authorizing statute. For example, in
response to attempts by the Department of Homeland Security to preempt
state security laws governing chemical facilities, Congress recently enacted
a savings clause that preserves state law unless it actually conflicts with
federal law.35
Preemption skeptics argue that regulatory preemption must be carefully
contained. Agency officials are not directly accountable to voters, they warn,
and agencies lack consistent White House supervision, whatever the executive
orders say. Federal agencies are, by design, focused on federal needs and
powers rather than state interests. As a practical matter, federal agencies are
not set up to evaluate and protect state regulatory powers - and they rarely
6
do.3 By invoking obstacle preemption, a creative agency could preempt
nearly any sort of state regulation simply by referencing a subordinate federal
purpose that is somehow impeded by the state law.37 Federal agencies are also
sometimes subject to "capture" by big business and other powerful lobbies.
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All this makes an agency particularly ill-suited to weigh the interests of state
and local interests in the course of accomplishing federal goals.
On this issue, we side with preemption skeptics. Agencies lack the expertise
to evaluate the federal-state balance, and it is unclear how serious an incentive
they face to fully consider state interests. Accordingly, absent clear evidence
that Congress intended to grant such authority to agencies, general rulemak
ing delegation language should not be read to include the authority to pre
empt state law.
In 2007, the Supreme Court almost tested this argument in Watters v.
8
Wachovia Bank.3 In a 5-3 decision (Justice Thomas did not participate),
the Court upheld a policy of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency that
shielded real estate lending by national banks from state consumer protection
laws. The Comptroller's office had based its policy on the National Bank Act's
general grant of authority to prescribe "restrictions and requirements" for real
estate lenders.39 The four appellate circuits examining the policy had found
that although the statute did not preempt state consumer protection laws, the
Comptroller's policy had; and because the statute granted the Comptroller
broad powers, that agency-made preemption was just as valid as if it had been
penned by Congress.40 But in upholding the Comptroller's policy, the
Supreme Court refused that gambit. Instead it found, perhaps implausibly,
that the banking statute had preempted state consumer protection laws all
along.41 As a result, there was no need to decide whether a federal agency, on
these or any other facts, has the independent power to preempt state law when
Congress is mute.
Still, the case is instructive. For one thing, it shows the murky progression
from legislative to agency-based preemption: it is not always easy to tell where
one ends and the other begins. For another, Wachovia Bank reminds us that
courts can interpret a set of facts in surprisingly different ways, bypassing (or,
some might say, deliberately avoiding) questions or doctrines that at first seem
relevant. Finally, Wachovia Bank teaches us to pay attention to the national or
local features of the subject matter involved. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court repeatedly emphasized the national significance of the interstate bank
ing system, a network now more than one hundred years old and deeply
embedded in the federal-state structure. Perhaps a different case, involving
a less traditional federal role or a less pervasive statutory system, would come
13
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out differently. We examine the importance of regulatory subject matter in the
next subsection.

What Is Being Preempted?

Perhaps courts should adjust their standards for preemption according to what
sort of state or federal regulation is at stake. Judges already do this in some
ways, although not always clearly or consistently. As generally understood, the
presumption against preemption requires courts to "start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded .. .
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."42 The implica
tion is that the presumption is most powerful where "the State's historic police
powers" have been threatened.43 In contrast, the presumption may have less
force "when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence."44
Where federal lawmakers cut too close to the bone, the Supreme Court has
occasionally gone further, requiring not just clear evidence of preemptive
intent (an approach we favor), but a clear statement of intent within the
statute. Thus, in Gregory v. Ashcroft45 the Supreme Court read a broad federal
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment not to cover state
judges, leaving in place the state's constitutional requirement that state judges
retire by age seventy. Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
warned that the Court should not "upset the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers" unless Congress made "its intention to do so unmis
6
takably clear in the language of the statute."4 Finding no clear statutory
language intended to displace core state functions, the majority held that
the age discrimination statute did not apply to state judges. In the environ
mental area, courts have rejected agency statutory interpretations that might
"encroach upon a traditional state power."47
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These practices have created a kind of "special case" analysis in which
judges are reluctant to read federal laws to upset "historic" powers, "core"
authority, or "traditional" balance. The rationale goes back to the debate
about the Tenth Amendment and "political safeguards." Recall that, under
today's understanding of the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment has been
interpreted to protect state sovereignty in court in only limited ways, when
federal law threatens to outright "commandeer" local executive or legislative
resources. This understanding supplanted an earlier view, held a quarter
century ago, that exclusively reserved to the states certain core powers, such
8
as the authority to set labor standards for state employees.4 That view was
abandoned in the i985 case Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.49 The effect was that state powers would now, for the most part,

be protected by Congress through the political process, rather than through
categorical judicial standards. However, the Gregory case adds a gloss to this
rule by imposing a high burden to show congressional intent to interfere with
core state functions before a court will read a federal statute to regulate those
functions. As the Court in that case put it: "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia
has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against
intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be abso
lutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."50
Suggesting that a state law most deserves protection from preemption when
it implicates a "core power" is not without difficulties. For one, it is sometimes
hard to determine when a core power is at stake and when it is not. Is a federal
law banning guns near schools a law about crime or about the local educa
tional environment? Are federal restrictions on wetlands development more
properly seen as national environmental protections or intrusions on the local
core power of land-use planning? In addition, what should one do when a core
state power confronts a core federal power? Wachovia Bank, for instance,
pitted Michigan's traditionally local interest in consumer protection against
the federal government's traditionally national interest in banking. Was the
Court correct in refusing to apply a presumption against preemption in this
special case? New Jersey's effort to impose additional safety requirements on
local chemical plants suggests a similar situation. There the state's tradition
ally local interest in public safety overlapped with the federal government's
national interest in homeland security. For our part, we find arguments based
on endemic powers very problematic. Sorting governmental interests is not
like sorting checkers. Often particular regulatory interests cannot be assigned
48
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to one side or the other; instead they are negotiated and shared. Modern
theories of cooperative federalism and instrument choice emphasize this
point. In addition, the categories used to define government objectives, like
public safety or homeland security, are too easily manipulated by those aiming
for a specific result.
Still, it is possible to imagine other special cases where the state powers
subject to preemption seem unusually important or deserving of protection.
In Chapter 4, for example, Professor Morrison would require a clear statement
of intent before a federal law can be invoked to preempt "the core enforce
ment activities of an elected state attorney general."51 This rule, in his view,
would promote local self-governance, by deferring to local law-enforcement
interests pursued by a popularly elected state law-enforcement official. It
would promote national democratic accountability by forcing Congress to
specifically consider and issue a statement about preemption in this area
before its laws could be used to undermine such local law-enforcement efforts.

What Do "Savings Clauses" Save?
As we mentioned earlier, federal statutes concerned with public health or the

environment often include a provision that preserves a state's right to regulate
in an even more protective way. In the last decade, such provisions, called
"savings clauses," have stirred controversy in the federal courts. As Professor
Sandi Zellmer shows in Chapter 7, these clauses have received erratic treat
ment in the courts. Should savings clauses be interpreted broadly, as preemp
tion skeptics argue? Or should they be read narrowly, as urged by advocates of
national uniformity? The issue is ostensibly one of statutory interpretation.
But because Congress can usually share or hoard its power as it sees fit, one's
assessment often appears linked to views about federalism.
In United States v. Locke,52 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
federal Oil Pollution Act of i990, despite the existence of several savings
clauses, preempted Washington State's ability to regulate oil tankers operating
in state waters. The Court reasoned that because the savings clauses appeared
in a section of the statute titled, "Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation,"
their otherwise broad language must be restricted to liability rules and could
not be read to permit "substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct."53
See Trevor W. Morrison, ch. 4, "The State Attorney General and Preemption." Morrison
would include an exception for cases in which compliance with both the state and federal laws
was physically impossible.
52 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
53 Id. at 105.
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As in the federal banking cases, the Court also emphasized the "federal"
nature of the subject matter - in this case the "at-sea conduct of vessels" declining to "give broad effect to savings clauses where doing so would upset
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."54
Later in the same term, the Supreme Court narrowly construed another
savings clause on a slightly different theory. In Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co. ,55 the Court ruled 5-4 that a federal motor safety law preempted a state tort
action alleging design defect for failure to include an air bag. Although the act
expressly preempted "any safety standard" different from the federal standard,
it included a savings clause stating that compliance with a federal standard

"does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."56 Never
theless, the savings clause was insufficient to rescue the "no air bags" tort
claim. The Court reasoned that the tort suit presented an obstacle that "con
flicts" with the federal goal of preserving manufacturer flexibility to phase in
air bags, thus creating a case for implied preemption.57 The savings clause, the
Court found, was not worded in a way to save state laws from implied pre
emption. Rather, the clause seemed targeted only at the express preemption
contained in the "any safety standard" language.
The Geier opinion left many lawyers wondering what a savings clause is
now able to save. The majority insisted that it had not changed any back
ground preemption rules and suggested that savings clauses could negate
obstacle preemption if properly worded, although it did not say how.5 8 Justice
Stevens, in dissent, accused the majority of unfurling a blanket rule that
would always protect obstacle preemption from savings clauses.59 He sug
gested the majority had dumped the traditional presumption against preemp
tion in favor of the more immediate needs of the Department of
.
6
Transportahon. 0
Can Congress, through a savings clause, deactivate implied preemption
when state law poses obstacles to federal goals? Does such a functional barrier
now conjure (as Justice Stevens decries) a sort of presumption against the
presumption against preemption? The answer to the first question is presum
ably yes, because Congress in theory is free to create statutory goals flexible
enough to tolerate state obstacles. Even so, Geier suggests this intent must be
54
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stated very clearly. We may be approaching the point where "clear state
ments" are necessary both to invoke and to avoid preemption. The answer
to the second question is in the eye of the beholder. Although the presumption
against preemption is in no danger of abandonment, it does - in our view occasionally get misplaced.

CONCLUSION
As American federalism makes clear, redundancy is complicated. The push

me-pull-you model of shared government offers big advantages, such as dem
ocratic responsiveness, innovation, and flexibility. But the costs are real, not
the least of which is the judicial effort necessary to keep all players within their
appropriate bounds. What makes this area of the law so fascinating is that, if
you study it long enough, it will inevitably pit your principles against a desired
outcome. States' rights look good to an environmentalist favoring stricter auto
pollution laws in California or safer standards at New Jersey chemical plants.
But states' rights arguments have also been used by courts to limit the pro
tection of the nation's wetlands and immunize state agencies from environ
mental citizen suits. Conservatives have the same problem, sometimes
struggling, for instance, to show why federal gun restrictions may not be
foisted on the states but why federal marijuana restrictions may. 61 Although
not all of these cases involve preemption, they do involve the basic values at
stake in the preemption debate, namely a concern for local democracy and
state experimentation, on one side, and a desire for national uniformity and
efficiency on the other.
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